Password encryption runs into the problem that the password has to be passed along somehow — and passed more safely than the message itself. Here that is not needed: the recipient publishes their public key once, you encrypt with it, and only they can read it with their secret key. There is nothing to arrange in advance.
Keys and encryption are computed in your browser. We see neither the keys nor the text.
Leave it empty and the recipient reads the message without learning who sent it. With a key they see whose key encrypted it, and that cannot be forged.
A phrase uses the same salt for everyone — otherwise the key would not reproduce. A short phrase here is the same as handing over your secret key.
Neither keys nor messages go anywhere: everything is computed in this tab.
The recipient comes here, creates a key pair and publishes the public one — on a site, in a profile, in a pinned message. The secret one they keep. Anyone who wants to write to them takes that public key, encrypts a message with it and sends the resulting line, even in an open chat. Only the owner of the secret key can read it.
A public key can only encrypt — it cannot decrypt, which is why handing it out is safe. That is the main difference from a password: with a password the same secret both locks and unlocks, and so it has to be transmitted.
It is not in the cipher but in where you got the public key. Whoever can substitute a message on the way can substitute the key too — and then you encrypt for them, and having read it they forward it on to the real recipient, and nobody notices anything. So the key must come from a different channel than the conversation: the recipient’s website, a pinned message, a business card, from them in person.
Nearby: sign a message, if you need to prove authorship of an open text, encrypt text with a password, when a shared password does exist, and encrypt a file.
Just as there are no visit logs in the VPN itself: there is nothing to hand over on request.
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